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ABSTRACT 
Wireless sensor networks are collections of large number of sensor nodes.  The sensor nodes are featured 
with limited energy, computation and transmission power. Each node in the network coordinates with 
every other node in forwarding their packets to reach the destination. Since these nodes operate in a 
physically insecure environment; they are vulnerable to different types of attacks such as selective 
forwarding and sinkhole. These attacks can inject malicious packets by compromising the node. 
Geographical routing protocols of wireless sensor networks have been developed without considering the 
security aspects against these attacks. In this paper, a secure routing protocol named secured greedy 
perimeter stateless routing protocol (S-GPSR) is proposed for mobile sensor networks by incorporating 
trust based mechanism in the existing greedy perimeter stateless routing protocol (GPSR). Simulation 
results prove that S-GPSR outperforms the GPSR by reducing the overhead and improving the delivery 
ratio of the networks. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
  Recently wireless sensor networks have drawn a lot of attention due to broad applications in 
military and civilian operations. Sensor nodes in the network are characterized by severely 
constrained, energy resources and communicational capabilities.  Due to small size and 
unattention of the deployed nodes, attackers can easily capture and rework them as malicious 
nodes. Karlof and Wagner [1] also have revealed that routing protocols of sensor networks are 
insecure and highly vulnerable to malicious nodes. It can either join the network externally or 
may originate internally by compromising an existing benevolent node [2]. The attacks 
launched by internally generated compromised nodes are the most dangerous type of attacks. 
These compromised nodes can also carry out both passive and active attacks against the 
networks [3]. In passive attack a malicious node only eavesdrops upon the packet contents, 
while in active attacks it may imitate, drop or modify legitimate packets [4]. Sinkhole is one of 
the common type of active attack [5] in which a node, can deceitfully modify the routing 
packets. So, it may lure other sensor nodes to route all traffic through it. The impact of sinkhole 
is to launch further active attacks on the traffic, which is routed through it.  
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Due to limited capabilities of sensor nodes, providing security and privacy against these attacks 
is a challenging issue to sensor networks. In order to protect network against malicious 
attackers, numbers of routing protocols have been developed to improve network performance 
with the help of cryptographic techniques. Security mechanisms used in these routing protocols 
of sensor networks detect the compromised node and then revoke the cryptographic keys of the 
network. But, requirements of such secure routing protocols include configuration of the nodes 
with encryption keys and the creation of a centralized or distributed key repository to realize 
different security services in the network [6].  
In addition, secure routing protocols utilising cryptographic methods also require excessive 
overheads. However, only few routing protocols such as secured dynamic source routing 
protocols (S-DSR) for wireless sensor networks address the security mechanism by using trust 
based model against various attacks [7]. S-DSR forwards the packets to successive nodes given 
in the source node route header by checking its trust levels only.  S-DSR will not utilise 
geographic position of the neighbour node closest to the destination to forward the packet. 
Greedy perimeter stateless routing is one of the protocols which transmits packet by using the 
position of neighbour node with respect to the destination node. GPSR uses two methods such 
as greedy forwarding and perimeter forwarding mechanism to transmit data from source to 
destination. But GPSR is also exposed to various types of attackers. In this paper, secured 
greedy perimeter stateless routing (S-GPSR) is implemented by including trust mechanism and 
mobility model for nodes in greedy perimeter stateless routing to protect nodes from sinkhole 
attacks. This S-GPSR is simulated by using ns-2.32 for different coverage areas of 300m×300m 
and 500m×500m with 150 and 200 numbers of nodes considering mobile nodes in the network.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes about the greedy perimeter stateless 
routing. Section 3 deals with the proposed secured greedy perimeter stateless routing of wireless 
sensor networks. Simulation results are discussed in Section 4 to obtain delivery ratio, delay and 
routing overhead of the proposed security scheme and conclusions are drawn in Section 5. 
2. GREEDY PERIMETER STATELESS ROUTING 
Routing in sensor networks is very challenging due to several characteristics that distinguish 
them from contemporary communication and wireless ad-hoc networks. First of all, it is not 
possible to build a global addressing scheme for the deployment of sheer number of sensor 
nodes. Therefore, traditional IP-based protocols cannot be applied to sensor networks. Second, 
in contrary to typical communication networks almost all applications of sensor networks 
require the flow of sensed data from multiple sources to a particular sink. Third, generated data 
traffic has significant redundancy in it since multiple sensors may generate same data within the 
vicinity of a phenomenon. Such redundancy needs to be exploited by routing protocols to 
improve energy and bandwidth utilization. Fourth, sensor nodes are tightly constrained in terms 
of transmission power, on-board energy, processing capacity and storage and thus require 
careful resource management. 
Due to the above differences, many new algorithms have been proposed for the problem of 
routing data in sensor networks. These routing mechanisms have considered the characteristics 
of sensor nodes along with the application and architecture requirements. Almost all routing 
protocols can be classified as data-centric, hierarchical or location-based although there are few 
distinct ones based on network flow or QoS awareness. Data-centric protocols are query-based 
and depend on the naming of desired data, which helps in eliminating many redundant 
transmissions. Hierarchical protocols aim at clustering the nodes so that cluster heads can do 
some aggregation and reduction of data in order to save energy [8]. Location-based protocols 
utilize the position information to relay the data to desired regions rather than the whole 
network. 
The Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing is one of the commonly used location-based routing 
protocols for establishing and maintaining a sensor network. This protocol virtually operates in 
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a stateless manner and has the ability for multi-path routing. In GPSR, it is assumed that all 
nodes recognise the geographical position of destination node with which communication is 
desired. This location information (i.e.) geographical position is also used to route traffic to its 
requisite destination from the source node through the shortest path. Each transmitted data 
packet from node contains the destination node’s identification and its geographical position in 
the form of two four-byte float numbers. Each node also periodically transmits a beacon, to 
inform its adjacent nodes regarding its current geographical co-ordinates. The node positions are 
recorded, maintained and updated in a neighbourhood table by all nodes receiving the beacon. 
To reduce the overhead due to periodic beacons, the node positions are piggy-backed onto 
forwarded data packets. 
GPSR supports two mechanisms for forwarding data packets: greedy forwarding and perimeter 
forwarding [9].  
i) Greedy Forwarding 
 In the first mechanism, all data packets are forwarded to an adjacent neighbour that is 
geographically positioned closer to the intended destination. This mechanism is known as 
greedy forwarding. The forwarding is done on a packet to packet basis. Hence, minimal state 
information is required to be retained by all nodes. It makes protocol most suitable for resource 
starved devices. The greedy forwarding mechanism is shown in Figure1. However, this 
mechanism is susceptible to failure in situations where the distance between forwarding node 
and final destination is less than the distance between the forwarding node’s adjacent 
neighbours and destination.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Greedy forwarding mechanism 
ii) Perimeter Forwarding 
To overcome routing problems in such scenarios, GPSR engages perimeter forwarding mode. In 
perimeter mode, the data packet is marked as being in perimeter mode along with the location 
where greedy forwarding failed. These perimeter mode packets are forwarded using simple 
planar graph traversal. Each node receiving a data packet marked as in perimeter mode uses the 
right-hand rule to forward packets to nodes, which are located counterclockwise to the line 
joining forwarding node and the destination. The perimeter forwarding mechanism is shown in 
Figure 2. Each node, while forwarding perimeter mode packets, compares its present distance to 
the destination from the point where greedy forwarding has failed. If the current distance is less, 
packet is routed through greedy forwarding repeatedly from that point onwards.  
The protocol has been designed and developed based on the assumption that all nodes in the 
network would execute the protocol in a sincere manner. However, due to number of reasons 
including malice, incompetence and selfishness, nodes frequently deviate from defined 
standards leading to routing predicaments. 
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Figure 2. Perimeter forwarding mechanism 
 
3. SECURED GREEDY PERIMETER STATELESS ROUTING PROTOCOL Of 
WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 
GPSR scans its neighbourhood table to retrieve the next hop which is optimal and leads to the 
destination, during packet transmission to a known host. As there may be more than one such 
hop available, GPSR selects an adjacent neighbour that has the least distance to a particular 
destination. In S-GPSR, the trust levels used in conjunction with the geographical distances are 
incorporated in the neighbourhood table to create the most trusted distance route rather than the 
default minimal distance. To compute direct trust in a node, an effort-return based trust model is 
used [10]. The accuracy and sincerity of immediate neighbouring nodes is ensured by observing 
their contribution to packet forwarding mechanism. 
To implement the trust derivation mechanism, Trust Update Interval (TUI) of each forwarded 
packet is buffered in the node as (GPSR Agent::buffer packet). The TUI is a very critical 
component of such a trust model. It determines the time a node should wait before assigning a 
trust or distrust level to a node based upon the results of a particular event. After transmission, 
each node promiscuously listens for the neighbouring node to forward the packet. If neighbour 
forwards the packet in proper manner within the TUI, its corresponding trust level is 
incremented. However, if the neighbouring node modifies the packet in an unexpected manner 
or does not forward the packet at all, its trust level is decremented. 
Every time a node transmits a data or control packet, it immediately brings its receiver into 
promiscuous mode (GPSR Agent::tap), so as to overhear its immediate neighbour forwarding 
the packet [11]. The sending node verifies the different fields in the forwarded IP packet for 
requisite modifications through a sequence of integrity checks (GPSR Agent::verify packet 
integrity). If the integrity checks succeed, it confirms that the node has acted in a benevolent 
manner and so its direct trust counter is incremented.  On the other hand, if the integrity check 
fails or the forwarding node does not transmit the packet at all, then its corresponding direct 
trust measure is decremented so that the node is treated as malicious node. The S-GPSR is 
explained by using flow chart which is illustrated through Figure 3. 
4. SIMULATION RESULTS 
The trust and mobility model is implemented in the existing GPSR protocol to obtain the S-
GPSR protocol. The S-GPSR protocol is simulated using Network Simulator-2.32[12] to 
emulate selective forwarding and sinkhole attack in the mobile sensor network. The network 
animator output for 150 nodes with 10 malicious nodes indicated in red circle is shown in 
Figure 4. The performance parameters such as delivery ratio, delay and routing overhead are 
calculated for two different number of nodes (150 and 200) by varying the number of malicious 
nodes from 5 to 25 with various coverage areas such as 300×300 (m2) and 500×500(m2). The 
parameters used in the simulation are listed in Table 1. 
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          Figure 3. Flowchart of S-GPSR  
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Table.1 Simulation parameters 
 
Simulation Parameters Values 
Number of Nodes 150 and 200 
Geographical area(m2) 300×300, 500×500 
Packet Size(bytes) 512 
Traffic Type CBR 
Number of malicious nodes 5 to 25 
Mobility model Random way point 
Pause time(s) 20 
Simulation time(s) 100 
 
 
Figure 4.Network animator output for 150 nodes with 10 malicious nodes 
4.1. Delivery Ratio 
Delivery ratio of S-GPSR is higher than that of GPSR for 150 and 200 nodes with different 
coverage area of 300x300(m2) and 500x500 (m2) which is shown in Figure 5, Figure 6, Figure 7 
and Figure 8. The delivery ratio of S-GPSR is almost 98% up to 10 malicious nodes which is far 
better than GPSR which is illustrated by Figure 5. As the number of malicious nodes is 
increased further, the delivery ratio of S-GPSR is nearly 27% greater than that of the GPSR for 
150 nodes. For 200 nodes, S-GPSR outperforms GPSR by providing delivery ratio of nearly 
98% up to 15 malicious nodes.  
On increasing the number of malicious nodes further S-GPSR provides a comparable increment 
of nearly 25% than that of GPSR which is shown in Figure 6. The fact is that shorter routes are 
preferred for transmitting the packets from source to destination in S-GPSR. Moreover, S-GPSR 
selects or deselects the neighbour node for routing process based on their trust levels to avoid 
the malicious node. Thus S-GPSR improves the forwarding rate by increasing the delivery ratio.  
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Figure 5. Delivery ratio with respect to no. of malicious nodes for 200 nodes with coverage area 
300x300 m2 
 
Figure 6. Delivery ratio with respect to no. of malicious nodes for 200 nodes with coverage area 
300x300 m2 
 
Figure 7. Delivery ratio with respect to no. of malicious nodes for 150 nodes with coverage area  
500x500 m2 
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Figure 8. Delivery ratio with respect to no. of malicious nodes for 200 nodes with coverage area  
500x500 m2 
4.2. Routing Overhead 
It is the ratio between total numbers of control packets generated to total number of data packets 
received during simulation time. S-GPSR has an overall lower routing overhead compared to 
that of GPSR. This is illustrated through the results revealed in Figure 9, Figure 10,  
Figure 11 and   Figure 12. 
Though routing overhead of S-GPSR and GPSR increases for increased values of malicious 
nodes, S-GPSR achieves significant reduction in routing overhead of nearly 73% compared to 
that of GPSR. The reduced overhead is due to less number of control packets generated for each 
data packet in S-GPSR. 
 
Figure 9. Routing overhead with respect to no. of malicious nodes for 150 nodes with coverage 
area 300x300 m2 
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Figure 10. Routing overhead with respect to no. of malicious nodes for 200 nodes with coverage 
area 300x300 m2 
 
Figure 11. Routing overhead with respect to no. of malicious nodes for 150 nodes with coverage 
area 500x500 m2 
 
Figure 12. Routing overhead with respect to no. of malicious nodes for 200 nodes with coverage 
area 500x500 m2 
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4.3. Delay 
 
Figure 13. Delay with respect to no. of malicious nodes for 150 nodes with coverage area 
300x300 m2 
 
Figure 14. Delay with respect to no. of malicious nodes for 200 nodes with coverage area 
300x300 m2 
 
Figure 15. Delay Vs no. of malicious nodes for 150 nodes with coverage area 500x500 m2 
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Figure 16. Delay Vs no. of malicious nodes for 200 nodes with coverage area 500x500 m2 
It is verified through simulation results shown in Figure 13,   Figure 14, Figure 15 and Figure 16 
that delay of S-GPSR protocol is higher than that of GPSR protocol. When numbers of 
malicious nodes are increased further, S-GPSR increases delay by 4% than that of GPSR 
protocol. S-GPSR selects intermediate nodes based upon their trusted path in addition to the 
minimal distance from the destination. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Secured greedy perimeter stateless routing protocol is implemented for mobile sensor network 
with different coverage area considering 150 and 200 number of nodes for simulation. It is 
compared with greedy perimeter stateless routing protocol for different number of malicious 
nodes. The results show that on the average, the routing overhead achieved using the S-GPSR 
protocol was 73% less than the standard GPSR protocol. Further more, an improvement of 25% 
in the delivery ratio have been achieved in the S-GPSR protocol. The improvement in the above 
mentioned network performance is mainly due to smaller trust values, shorter routing decisions 
and less number of control packets taken by the trust based model implemented in GPSR  to get 
rid of the attackers. 
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